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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine the following scenario: a disgruntled employee' decides to take it upon
herself to seek revenge on her employer corporation. She secretly creates a strand
of malicious computer code 2 that will damage any computer it infects. From her
home computer, the employee uses her dial-up modem4 to access' the corporation's
computer system and releases the code into it, destroying data on every company
computer that becomes infected and completing her mission of revenge. However,
the nightmare does not end here. Unbeknownst to anyone, including the culprit, co-
workers that are working from infected terminals are perpetuating the malicious
1. A large portion of corporate computer systems are misused or sabotaged by corporate employees. See
United States v. Sablan, 92 F.3d 865,866(9th Cir. 1996) (affirming the conviction of a former bank employee who
logged into the bank's computer system with her old password and damaged files); see also Jonathan Saltzman,
Computer Expert Faces Charge of Putting Virus in Textron's System, PROVIDENCE J. BULL., Oct. 1, 1996, at A 1,
available at 1996 WL 12467001 (reporting authorities' description of a computer specialist accused of causing
damage to Textron's computers by e-mailing programs infected with a virus to all Textron's computer system users
as a "disgruntled employee"); see Martin Wolk, Danger on the Home Front, MSNBC, (Oct. 31, 2000), at
http:llwww.msnbc.comlnews/483684.asp (copy on file with The TransnationalLawyer) (discussing how often the
culprit of a security breach in a corporation is one of the corporation's own employees); see David Noack,
Employees, Not Hackers, Greatest Computer Threat, MSNBC (Jan. 4, 2000), at http://www.apbnews.
com/newscenter/intemetcrime/2000/01/04/comptheftOlO4_01.htmi (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
Teenagers are also common culprits responsible for virus epidemics. See Leef Smith, Web MarauderPleads Guilty;
U.S. Government Sites Were Among Targets of 'Zyklon,' WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 1999, at B2.
2. The term "code" is defined as "instructions written in a computer programming language." WEBSTER'S
NEW WORLD DICrIONARY OF COMPUTER TERMS 110 (8th ed. 2000) [hereinafter WEBSTER'S DICTONARY].
3. An "infection" of a computer is defined as "the presence of a virus within a computer system or on a
disk. The infection may not be obvious to the user; many viruses, for example, remain in the background until a
specific time and date, when they display prank messages or erase data." Id. at 275.
4. The term "dial-up modem" is defined as follows: "In contrast to a modem designed for use with a leased
line, a modem that can dial a telephone number, establish a connection, and close the connection when it is no
longer needed. Most personal computer modems are dial-up modems." Id at 160.
5. A "dial-up access" is defined as "a means of connecting to another computer or a network such as the
Internet with a modem-equipped computer." Id. at 159.
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code with every e-mail 6 they send7 through the Internet. The code reaches countless
computer terminals, irrespective of jurisdictional and sovereign boundaries. The
code causes millions of dollars in damage throughout the world before it can be
quashed. But the greater injustice resulting from this scenario has yet to be realized:
the country in which the disgruntled employee resides has no law under which to
prosecute her act, and her extradition to a country which does is unfeasible. She
emerges unpunished by the law. What may sound like an imaginary plot for a
dramatic movie is unfortunately an all too real scenario, reflective of how a
computer virus9 proliferates into a worldwide problem.
International borders have long been a stumbling block in the successful
prosecution of crimes. There are a number of common scenarios that illustrate this
point: an individual may commit a crime in one country, then flee to another, in an
attempt to escape the law; she may commit an act in a country that does not consider
the action criminal; 0 or she may act in one country, which produces effects in
another." Any of these three generalizations lead to prosecutorial problems for the
countries involved. Questions of jurisdiction are inevitably invoked.
In response to jurisdictional problems, the world engineered a solution:
extradition.12 Extradition works because most nations prosecute the same types of
crimes, although the severity of punishment varies from country to country.13
Deterring crime is an underlying policy goal for the enactment of all laws. 14 Through
6. An "e-mail" is defined as "the use of a computer network to send and receive messages. Also called
electronic mail. Although transmission is instantaneous or nearly so, the message may not be received until the
recipient logs on and receives notice that mail has arrived." Id at 186.
7. See Eric J. Sinrod & William P. Reilly, Cyber-Crimes, A Practical Approach to the Application of
Federal Computer Crime Laws, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 177,216 (2000) (noting that a
malicious code can also be transmitted via an infected computer disk).
8. See Reno v. A.C.L.U., 521 U.S. 844,851(1997) (discussing the history and background ofthe Internet).
9. A "virus" is defined as
a program designed as a prank or as sabotage that replicates itself by attaching to other programs and
carrying out unwanted and sometimes damaging operations. When viruses appear, the effects vary,
ranging from prank messages to erratic system software performance or catastrophic erasure of all the
information on a hard disk. Don't ever assume that a prank message means that's all the virus will do.
Webster's Dictionary, supra note 2, at 563.
10. See infra notes 101-05 and accompanying text (setting forth how the outbreak of the Chernobyl virus
posed this particular prosecutorial problem for Taiwan).
11. See infra notes 108-13 and accompanying text (setting forth how the outbreak of the ]LOVEYOU virus
posed this particular prosecutorial problem for the Philippines).
12. See John T. Soma et al., Transnational Extradition for Computer Crimes: Are New Treaties and Laws
Needed?, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 317, 318 (1997) (explaining that "the process of extradition can be defined simply
as the surrendering of a criminal or accused criminal by one sovereign to another"); see also I.A. SHEARER,
EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (1971); see also M. CHERIFBASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 1 (1974) (providing a complete discussion on extradition).
13. See infra note 155 and accompanying text (illustrating the wide discrepancy in prison sentences for
computer offenses in various countries).
14. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 29-77 (2d ed. 1999) (discussing the
theories of deterring punishment and relevant U.S. case law).
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extradition, an international criminal can run but cannot hide. The deterrent effect
of criminal laws are thereby strengthened.
However, a new villain-the virus author t -has surfaced, bringing a new crime
into the international forum: the spread of the computer virus.' 6 However, she
escapes prosecution 17 largely because many countries simply have no cyber'8 crime
laws. Therefore, extradition is not a viable prosecutorial alternative. Free from the
fear of prosecution, the virus author feels no need to stop wreaking global havoc.
This Comment addresses the hardships experienced by nations around the world
in attempting to prosecute virus authors. Ultimately, this Comment argues that
among the numerous proposals attempting to address the problem, the Council of
Europe's draft Cyber-Crime Treaty' 9 is the best solution offered thus far. Part II
focuses on the crime of the spread of a computer virus and the type of damage that
a virus author is capable of inflicting across the world from a single isolated
terminal. This section goes on to discuss the current state of cyber crime laws, or
lack thereof, in the United States and other nations, and their level of success in
prosecuting virus authors. Part IlI discusses the difficulty in prosecuting cyber
criminals, illustrating this with a few examples from recent history. Part IV
evaluates some solutions proposed by various parties and gives a detailed
description of the relevant sections of the Council of Europe's proposed solution:
a draft Cyber-Crime Treaty. Finally, Part V concludes that, despite its minor flaws,
the Council of Europe's draft Cyber-Crime Treaty is the most efficient and effective
way to effect immediate change in light of the other proposed solutions.
II. THE CRIME OF THE COMPUTER VIRUS
Because the spread of a computer virus is still a relatively new crime,
understanding the mechanics of a malicious code is a precursor to demonstrating
how the computer virus can be used as an instrument of crime. Upon concluding that
some type of conduct relating to computer use may be criminal in nature, the next
step is to identify how modem criminal law systems might be better equipped to
deal with the problem. Examples of recent virus outbreaks help illustrate why the
spread of computer viruses constitutes criminal conduct, which necessitates strong
prosecutorial strategies.
15. The phrase "virus author" is used in a broad sense throughout this Comment. It defines an individual
who intentionally causes a malicious code to reach the Internet, whether injected directly or indirectly, and is not
limited to merely the individual who wrote the code.
16. See infra notes 23-41 and accompanying text (detailing the mechanics of a computer virus).
17. See, e.g., infra notes 101-13 and accompanying text (discussing how the authors of the ILOVEYOU and
Chernobyl viruses managed to escape prosecution because the Philippines and Taiwan did not have cyber crime
legislation in place at the time the acts were committed).
18. "Cyber" is defined as "a prefix that means computer." WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY, supra note 2, at 139.
19. The Draft Cyber-Crime Treaty is currently being drafted and reviewed by the Council of Europe and is
the latest attempt to fight cyber crime. For a complete discussion on the Council of Europe's Draft Cyber-Crime
Treaty within the context of this Comment, see infra notes 210-59 and accompanying text.
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A. The New Crime: The Computer Virus
This section begins by outlining the basics of a computer virus.2" It then
discusses how a computer virus is used to facilitate a crime." Finally, the section
concludes with an overview of the role a virus author plays in instigating that
22crime.
1. What is a Computer Virus?
A virus is one species of a malicious computer code 23 "written with the sole
intent to cause damage to a machine or to invade the machine to steal information." 24
"A virus is a program that infects a computer by inserting a copy of itself into the
computer and harms the computer in some manner, generally without the computer
user's awareness." '  Viruses can be harmful or benign. 26 The typical mode of
distributing a virus is via e-mail or an infected disk,27 but a virus cannot infect a
computer until the program is executed.28 Usually the unknowing recipient is duped
into opening an attached file in an e-mail or a file contained on a disk, thinking it is
20. See infra notes 23-41 and accompanying text (expounding a detailed description of the basics of a
computer virus and what it constitutes).
21. See infra notes 42-53 and accompanying text (specifying how spreading a strand of malicious code can
constitute a criminal act).
22. See infra notes 54-78 and accompanying text (giving examples of three infamous virus authors and the
havoc they have wreaked).
23. See Sinrod & Rielly, supra note 7, at 215-23 (explaining that other types of malicious codes include
worms and Trojan Horse programs).
Worms are similar to viruses. However, one major distinction is that worms multiply without any human
interaction. A worm can wind its way through a network system without the need to be attached to a file,
unlike viruses.... [A] Trojan Horse program, or Trojan program, is an innocent-looking program that
contains hidden functions. They are loaded onto the computer's hard drive and executed along with the
regular program. However, hidden in the belly of the 'innocent' program is a sub-program that will
perform a function, mostly unknown to the user. Trojan programs can take the form of a popular
program where the original source code had been altered to hide the Trojan 'payload.'
Id. at 223.
24. Id. at 215.
25. ld. at 216.
26. Id. (describing how not all viruses do damage to their hosts). "For example, a virus could display an
innocuous message on a certain date. Although it might be annoying and create a sense of anxiousness, the virus
does not cause any measurable harm." Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. (distinguishing a virus that needs to be executed in order to infect a computer from a worm, which
does not require human interaction to infect a host computer). In order to "execute" a virus or a program, the
computer user must somehow activate it manually, usually by opening an attachment or running a program. Id. But
see Symantec, VBS.BubbleBoy, at http://www.symantec.com (visited Feb. 17, 2001) (copy on file with The
TransnationalLanyer) (describing how the BubbleBoy virus, which works underWindows 98 and Windows 2000,
activates when the infected e-mail is viewed and does not require detaching and running an attachment).
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harmless and/or it came from a friendly source.29 Hiding a "macro"3° routine in a
common Microsoft Office product file, such as Word or Excel where the macro tells
the computer to perform harmful actions, is another way a virus can be executed.31
Only files that are "executable" (.exe)32 are capable of transmitting a virus, whereas,
data files, such as image (.jpg and .gif), music (.wav and .mp3) or text (.txt) files are
not capable of transmitting a virus because they do not contain macro
functionality,33 or they cannot command the computer to perform any functions.
34
Once a virus is activated, the damage or interference it causes is not always
immediate or apparent.35 An author can design a virus to trigger in countless ways,36
and individuals are constantly inventing new triggering mechanisms. There are
several places a virus can hide within a host computer,37 and once the virus
infiltrates a computer, it can replicate and spread itself without further assistance
from the user. 8 Once triggered, the damage that a virus causes is referred to as the
"payload. 39 When the virus infects the hard drive,40 its payload launches. The
29. See Sinrod & Rielly, supra note 7, at 216.
30. A "macro" is defined as "a program consisting of recorded keystrokes and an application's command
language that, when run within an application, executes the keystrokes and commands to accomplish a task. Macros
can automate tedious and often-repeated tasks, such as saving and backing up a file to a floppy, or can create special
menus to speed data entry." WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY, supra note 2, at 331.
31. See Sinrod & Rielly, supra note 7, at 217.
32. An "executable program" is defined as "a program that is ready to run on a given computer. For a
program to be executable, it first must be translated, usually by a compiler, into the machine language of a particular
computer." WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY, supra note 2, at 197.
33. See supra note 30 (defining a "macro").
34. Sinrod & Rielly, supra note 7, at 217.
35. Id
36. Id. at 217 n.176 (explaining that the virus can be programmed by the author to trigger on a certain date,
when the computer user enters a certain word, when the computer restarts, after a certain amount of time has passed
after the virus is loaded into the system, or in any number of creative ways).
37. Id. (explaining how a virus can hide in the computer's memory or in the computer programs so that it
is activated each time the program is loaded).
38. Id. at 216.
39. Id. at217.
40. Id at 217 n.185 (illustrating the interactive relationship between the hard drive, processor, RAM, and
operating system). The following excerpt offers a general description of how the process works:
A hard disk, or memory, is the main memory where the programs and the operating system are
permanently stored. As an example, one can think of the hard drive as a large filing cabinet, the random
access memory (RAM) as a table, and the processor as a clerk. When the clerk wants to work on a file,
he goes to the filing cabinet and brings the file to the table, where he can open up the file and read it. If
the clerk wants to read another file, he repeats the process. The relationship between the hard drive,
RAM, and processor can be further illustrated by adjusting the variables. If a lot more filing cabinets are
added, but the size of the desk is still the same, the clerk will not be able to increase the number of files
he can put on the table. If the size of the desk is increased, but the clerk moves slowly, then too many
files on the desk may actually slow him down. The operating system is the set of instructions that
coordinate all of the actions that take place in the computer. Although operating systems often come on
CD-ROMs, they are not "computer programs." A program can only run "on top of an operating system."
The operating system is like the translator that gets all of the hardware and software talking together.
In the above example, the operating system is like the employee handbook that tells the clerk what he
is supposed to do and how he is supposed to do it.
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damaging interference that results can range from "annoyingly humorous.., to total
devastation" of the hard drive.4
2. The Role of the Computer Virus in Criminal Law
Computer crime legislation as a whole covers a wide variety of offenses.42 Since
computer crime legislation is still relatively new,43 it is necessary to understand
precisely how the proliferation of a virus constitutes computer crime. As computer
viruses began to evolve into serious security and financial threats, lawmakers began
criminalizing their distribution. In the United States, merely writing a piece of
malicious code is not a crime without the necessary intent to access an unauthorized
computer.44 To constitute a punishable offense, the virus must be knowingly
transmitted to another computer, via e-mail, infected disk, or otherwise.
When computer crimes were first recognized, they were simply encompassed
by traditional crimes, the only difference being that the crime was being committed
with the aid of a computer.45 As technology advanced, however, it became apparent
that new computer crimes, such as the intentional spread of viruses, were unique to
computers and thus needed particularized legislation. 6 There is an ongoing debate
in today's world as to whether such legislation is in fact necessary because a great
number of crimes committed with the use of a computer can be prosecuted under
traditional statutes already in existence.
Id.
41. Id. at 218 (noting one recent example of an irritating, yet harmless virus: "W95.LoveSong.998," which
caused a Korean love song to play on a certain date). "The Emperor" is an example of a devastating virus. Id. It will
"permanently overwrite data on the hard disk and then attempt to destroy the Flash BIOS (basic input-output
system)." Id.
42. See infra note 46 (considering crimes other than the spread of computer viruses that qualify as computer
crimes).
43. See, e.g., the Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Law, Pub. L. No. 98-473,
§2102(a), 98 Stat. 1837, 2190 (1984) (enacting the first computer crime legislation in the United States in 1984).
44. See infra note 92 and accompanying text (explaining that the current version of 18 U.S.C. § 1030
requires only an intent to access, not an intent to cause damage).
45. See, e.g., Sinrod & Rielly, supra note 7, at 179 (discussing traditional crimes of money laundering and
child pornography that become computer crimes when a computer is used to facilitate the act).
46. The spread of a computer virus is one example of a crime that qualifies as a computer crime because the
computer itself is the target of the offense. See id. at 187 (discussing other ways that a crime can qualify as a
computer crime: when a computer merely contains the evidence that a crime was indeed committed, and when a
computer is the tool used to commit the offense). An example of the former is a money launderer who "may use
a computer to store details of his laundering operation instead of relying on paper accounting records." Id. Another
example includes child pornographers whose "computers are often seized as the key evidence that the defendant
produced, possessed, received, and/or distributed child pornography." Id.; see also Veronica C. Silva & Pauline
Anne P. Escalante, Vigilance the Only Sure Solution to Cybercrimes (First of Two Parts), Bus. WORLD
(PHILIPPINES),May 9, 2000, at 16, available at 2000 WL 18794738 (explaining that an example of the latter, a crime
where the computer is the tool used to commit the crime, is a Denial of Service (DoS) attack). "DoS is not a virus
but it prevents internet traffic from reaching the target websites. The attacker in this case bombards the target sites
with millions of messages, thus preventing bonafide [sic] users from accessing these for hours." Id.
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Legal scholars and law enforcement experts differ in opinion as to where cyber
crimes fit within modem criminal law.47 Some experts believe that computer crimes,
including the mischievous use of viruses, are simply traditional crimes committed
with advanced technology, and current criminal laws suffice to punish computer
crimes.48 Other experts believe that cyber crimes are a new category of crime
requiring a comprehensive, separate legal framework to address the unique nature
of the emerging technologies and the unique set of challenges that traditional crimes
do not address.
49
In the United States, there are many statutes from which a federal prosecutor can
choose when prosecuting a computer criminal.5 Sometimes, a prosecutor uses a
traditional statute to prosecute a computer-related offense. For example, the federal
Copyright Infringement Act, 17 U.S.C. § 506 can be used to prosecute a copyright
violation, despite the fact that a person used a computer to facilitate the crime. Other
times, a prosecutor may utilize a new computer crime statute, tailor-made for crimes
that cannot be committed absent the aid of a computer. An example of such a statute
is the National Information Infrastructure Protection Act.5 t The prosecutor's choice
depends on the circumstances surrounding the crime and which statute is most likely
to lead to a successful prosecution.52 However, one country with a statute tailor-
made to combat cyber crime is not always the answer.53
47. See Sinrod & Rielly, supra note 7, at 180 (explaining how "current criminal laws on the books should
be applied to the various laws broken, such as trespass, larceny, and conspiracy"); see generally, Silva & Escalante,
supra note 46, at 16.
48. See Silva & Escalante, supra note 46, at 16 (stating the opinion of Ramon Ike V. Seneres, Director-
General of the National Computer Center in the Philippines, that the offense should be prosecuted as merely an
extension of traditional crimes). "There is no need to create special laws to prosecute cybercrimes if there are
existing implementable laws." Id. Hacking, he said, is merely breaking and entering, and "if you take something
then there's theft. The computerorthe Internetisjust a medium like PayTV, magazine, or VHS." Id.; Allen R. Stein,
The Unexpected Problem ofJurisdiction in Cyberspace, Symposium on Jurisdiction and the Internet, 32 Int'l Law.
1167, 1167 (1998) (opining that Internet activity "does not challenge existing jurisdictional paradigms"). "There
is nothing about legal relations over computer networks that in any way challenges our conventional notions about
how sovereign authority is allocated in the world." Id; see generally, Tomas A. Lipinski, The Developing Legal
Infrastructure and the Globalization of Information: Constructing a Framework for Critical Choices in the New
Millennium Internet-Character, Content and Confusion, 6 RicHMOND.J. L. & TECH. 19 (1999-2000) (discussing
the extension of traditional property rights and other information controls and regulations into cyberspace).
49. See LauraJ. Nicholson et aL., Computer Crimes, 37 AM. CRiM.L.REv. 207,212 (2000) (describing how
these include jurisdiction, international cooperation, intent, and the difficulty of identifying the perpetrator).
50. While state computer crime statutes do exist, this Comment only considers relevant federal statutes.
51. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000); see also infra notes 87-92 and accompanying text (discussing the National
Information Infrastructure Protection Act).
52. See Nicholson, supra note 49, at 220-22. For example, if the crime committed is a copyright violation,
a computer software company whose product is being replicated might choose to prosecute under the Copyright
Infringement Act, 17 U.S.C. § 506 because it is relatively easy to establish the elements of the crime: the
unauthorized copying of computer software, done willfully, for financial or commercial gain, or in the alternative
reproduction or distribution of software of a certain market value, without regard to financial gain. Id.
53. See infra notes 120-28 and accompanying text (discussing the problems surrounding prosecution even
when a tailor-made statute is in place).
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3. Illustrative Examples of Recent Virus Outbreaks
As technology advances, individuals consistently find ways to exploit it for
deviant purposes. 54 The vast majority of intrusive hacking is done for research
purposes, such as investigating breaches in security.55 There are those, however, that
use their software and computer talents in a mischievous manner, launching
computer viruses for purposes that are criminal in nature. 6 Some reports attribute
major financial and security threats to the ever-increasing volume of new viruses
released on the Internet each year.57 These virus releases can originate from any
location equipped with a telephone line, and the effects can vary widely. The act of
releasing a computer virus contains the basic elements of what makes certain
conduct criminal, namely community condemnation and moral delinquency.5 8
a. Melissa
The Melissa virus first surfaced in March 1999, rapidly infecting computers
across the world and causing eighty billion dollars in damages.59 Melissa was the
fastest-spreading virus the United States had ever seen, hitting over one hundred
thousand U.S. computers in just a few days.60 The virus spread via e-mail, invading
users' address books and sending up to fifty e-mail messages to addresses stored on
the infected computer.1 The virus enticed the user into opening an attachment with
the message subject header "Important Message from (the name of someone on the
54. See, e.g., Bob Sullivan, MSNBC, Virus Won't Let Victims Get Help (Nov. 28, 2000), at
http:llwww.msnbc.comlnews/495873.asp (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (describing a computer
virus "smart enough to block its victims from getting help"). "The bug, called MXT, was discovered in August [of
2000] ... [and] has one very sinister feature: once it infects a user, it's programmed to stop the victim from visiting
antivirus Web sites and sending "mayday" e-mails to antivirus companies." Id.
55. See infra notes 244-47 and accompanying text (voicing the concern of those opposed to any government
regulation that would hinder this type of security research).
56. See, supra note 1 and accompanying text (citing afew examples ofsecurity breaches caused by corporate
employees); see also JackMcCarthy, HackerMitnick CouldBeReleasedby Early2000, INFOWORLDDAILYNEWs,
Aug. 10, 1999, available at LEXIS, News Library, INFDLY File (describing sentencing and charges against Kevin
Mitnick, an infamous hacker who broke into computer networks and stole credit card numbers and software).
"Investigators arrested Mitnick in 1995 following a well-publicized manhunt that was the subject of the book
entitled 'Takedown.' He was charged with 25 counts of wire and computer fraud for breaking into the networks of
companies, including Sun Microsystems, Novell, and Motorola." Id.
57. See Sinrod &Rielly, supra note 7, at 215 (citing a report compiled in the United States by the Computer
Emergency ResponseTeam (CERT) estimating that 30,000 computer viruses currently exist and that approximately
300 new viruses are created each month).
58. See DRESSLER, supra note 14, at 1-6 (discussing the nature, sources, and limits of the criminal law).
59. See Damien Whitworh & Dominic Kennedy, Author Could Escape Arm of the Law, TIMES (London),
May 5, 2000 (estimating the amount of fiscal damage caused by the Melissa virus in 1999).
60. See Andrew J. Glass,Number, Types of Viruses Promise Only to Increase, SANDIEGo-UNIONTRIB.,Jun.
22, 1999, at 4, available at LEXIS, News Library, SDUT File.
61. See The Year's Computer Diseases, SAN'DIEGO UNION-TRiB., June 22, 1999, at 4, available at LEXIS,
News Library, SDUT File.
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list)., 62 Melissa spread rapidly, and within forty-eight hours major companies such
as Microsoft and Intel were forced to shut down their servers.63
b. Chernobyl
April 26, 1999 marked the thirteenth anniversary of Russia's Chernobyl nuclear
power plant meltdown, and the day Chen Ing-hau chose to trigger a release of his
virus of the same name causing "a meltdown of a different kind."64 The virus
"Chernobyl" or "CIm ''65 was a particularly frightening virus because its infection
actually damages a computer, rendering it physically inoperable.6 6 Infecting
computers running Windows 95 and 98, Chernobyl "delete[d] data on a computer's
hard drive and attempt[ed] to overwrite and destroy a PC's flash BIOS, which [are]
needed to boot the computer.' 67
Although Chernobyl "paralyzed" sixty million computers across the globe,68 it
scarcely affected the United States.69 Since the recent Melissa virus disaster,70 U.S.
companies improved their virus protection strategies that successfully shielded them
from the Chernobyl virus. 7' However, as the rest of the world was uninformed about
the Melissa virus and therefore unaware of the need to improve its technology,
62. See Sinrod &Rielly, supra note 7, at218 (describing the manner in which the Melissa virus perpetuated).
The Melissa Macro Virus was a virus that was hidden in a Microsoft Word attachment that appeared to
come from a person known to the recipient. When the attachment was opened, a list of pornographic
web site passwords were displayed. However, unknown to the user, the program also activated a macro
that read the first fifty e-mail addresses located in the Microsoft Outlook e-mail program and e-mailed
itself to the fifty addresses....
Id.
63. See id. (recounting that one company reported that its "500-employee computer network was buffeted
by 32,000 e-mail messages in a 45 minute period, effectively shutting it down for legitimate purposes").
64. Meltdown of the Different Kind, COMPLtrMES (Malaysia), May 3,1999.
65. See id. (explaining that the virus name of "CIH" represents the initials of its author, Chen Ing-hau). Ing-
hau developed the virus when he was an engineering student at Taiwan's Tatung Institute of Technology. Id.
66. See Whitworth & Kennedy, supra note 58.
67. Ann Harrison, Chernobyl Virus Not Even a Coldfor Most U.S. Companies, COMPUTERWORLD, May 3,
1999, available at LEXIS, News Library, CMPWLD File; see also The Year's Computer Diseases, supra note 60,
at 4 (describing how the Chernobyl virus spread itself from computer to computer).
68. Taiwan Prosecutes Chernobyl Virus Inventor, DEuTSCHE PRESsE-AGENTUR, Sept. 11, 2000, available
at LEXIS, News Library, DPA File [hereinafter Taiwan Prosecutes],
69. See Harrison, supra note 67, at 4 (stating that the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT)
Coordination Center at Carnegie Mellon University in Pittsburgh found that only 2,328 computers in the United
States reported damage by the virus). "'Most of the reported victims were home computer users and university
students and faculty', said CERT spokesman Bill Pollak. 'By contrast, 100,000 computers were infected with the
Melissa virus,' CERT said." Id.
70. See id. (elaborating on how the United States improved its virus defense abilities after fighting off the
Melissa virus attacks earlier in the year). "'The main reason most U.S. businesses were spared was that the Melissa
virus and its notoriety inspired companies to update or actually purchase antivirus software,' said Sal Viveros,
marketing manager at Network Associates Inc. in Santa Clara, Calif." Id.
71. Id.
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Chernobyl hit the rest of the world hard, with Asia suffering the most serious
damages.7"
c. ILOVEYOU
On May 4, 2000, the Internet experienced a monumental disaster when the
ILOVEYOU virus surfaced, infecting millions of computer files around the world.73
The virus, which quickly earned the nickname the "Love Bug" due to the "I Love
You" phrase displayed in the subject-matter heading of each contaminated e-mail,74
activates when the e-mail attachment is downloaded, thereby destroying image and
sound files stored in the computer.75 After infecting the terminal, it spreads by
automatically sending the e-mail to everyone in the infected computer's address
book and thus causing widespread infection.76 The "Love Bug" reportedly attacked
only Microsoft Windows operating systems, the dominant operating systems among
personal computers and where most e-mails are downloaded.77 Conservative
estimates show the loss directly attributed to the ILOVEYOU virus at around ten
billion dollars.78
B. Current Laws and Levels of Success
"All nations continue to struggle with defining computer crime and developing
computer crime legislation that is applicable to both domestic and international
audiences. ' 79 Unfortunately, countries are not advancing at equal speeds, and virus
authors are taking advantage of those countries making slower progress.80
Understanding the vast gap in the legislative advances of some nations when
compared to others leads to the conclusion that more must be done on an
international level in order to effectuate successful cyber crime prosecutions.
72. See id. (describing the widespread destruction in other countries caused by Chernobyl). "IT]he
Chernobyl virus damaged at least700,O00 computers in the Middle East and Asia. In South Korea, the virus infected
over 250,000 computers. The virus also damaged about 100,000 PCs in China and 300,000 in Turkey .. ." Id.
73. See 'Love Bug' Sparks Demand for Internet Policy Changes, ASIA PULSE, May 8, 2000, available at
2000 WL 2694811 [hereinafter 'Love Bug' Sparks Demand].
74. Id.
75. Editorial, Computer Viruses Pose Global Threat, YOMIUU SHIMBUN/DAILY YOMIURI, May 9,2000,
available at 2000 WL 20279161.
76. Id.
77. Silva & Escalante, supra note 46, at 16.
78. India: The Virus of Cyber-Crimes, Bus. LNE (Hindu), May 31, 2000, available at 2000 WL 19063708
[hereinafter India].
79. Nicholson, supra note 49, at 250.
80. See infra notes 101-13 and accompanying text (illustrating how two virus authors caused extensive
damage around the world yet evaded prosecution because the country where they were found did not have an
adequate law under which to prosecute them; these countries became "havens" of safety from the arm of the law).
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1. United States Law
There are at least forty different statutes in the United States under which
computer criminals can be charged.8' The United States realized that some offenses
such as viruses are unique to computers and require prosecution under specialized
statutes tailored to computer related activities.82 Therefore, the United States has
treated cyber crime as a distinct federal offense since 1984. Throughout the 1980S84
and 1990s, 85 Congress amended cyber crime statutes to reflect the growth in the
number and breadth of diversity of cyber crimes.86 In 1996, Congress passed the
National Information Infrastructure Protection Act (NIIPA) 18 U.S.C. § 1030 which
contains the most recent changes and modifications to the Counterfeit Access
Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Law.87 The statute, which previously only
covered crimes involving computers in more than one state, now covers any
computer with Internet access, even if all the computers involved in the crime are
located within one state.
88
81. See Nicholson, supra note 49, at 220-31 (discussing other federal statutes aside from the National
Information Infrastructure Protection Act under which a computer crime may be prosecuted; these include, but are
not limited to, the Copyright Act, the National Stolen Property Act, the mail and wire fraud statutes, the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, the Communications Decency Act of 1996, and the Child Pornography Prevention
Act of 1996).
82. See UNrrEDSTATES SENTENCINGCOMISSION, COMPUTrERFRAUDWORKING GROUP, REPORTSUMMARY
OF FINDINGS 3 (1993) (surmising that even though traditional statutes are capable of prosecuting some computer
crimes, those crimes that are specialized computer offenses need more specifically tailored laws of their own).
83. In 1984, Congress passed the Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Law. Pub. L.
No. 98-473, § 2102(a), 98 Stat. 1837, 2190 (1984) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000)).
84. Congress revisedits 1984 legislation three times in 1986,1988, and 1989. For past versions of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1030, see respectively, Pub. L. No. 99-474, § 2, 100 Stat. 1213 (1986) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1030
(2000)); Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7065, 102 Stat. 4404 (1988) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000)); Pub, L.
No. 101-73, § 962(a)(5), 103 Stat. 503 (1989) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000)).
85. Congress revised its legislation three more times during the 1990s in 1990, 1994, and 1996. For past
versions of 18 U.S.C. § 1030 for each corresponding version, see respectively, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1205(e), §
2597 (j), § 3533,104 Stat. 4831,4910,4925 (1990) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000)); Pub. L. No. 103-
322, § 290001(b)-(f), 108 Stat. 2097-2099 (1994) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000)); Pub. L. No. 104-
294, § 201, 110 Stat. 3488, 3491-94 (1996) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000)).
86. See Nicholson, supra note 49, at 212 (explaining that the volume of the original legislation of the 1984
Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Law expanded greatly to address the growing number
and types of computer-related crimes in existence).
87. See supra notes 83-85 (tracing the changes that Congress has made through the years to the Counterfeit
Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Law).
88. Id. at 212 (tracing the changes that Congress has made through the years on the legislation as new
criminal issues involving computers have arisen).
The 1984 Act was intentionally narrowly tailored to protect classified United States' defense and foreign
relations information, financial institution and consumer reporting agency files, and access to computers
operated for the government.... [I]n the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, Congress expanded
the scope of the law and attempted to define its terms more clearly. Congress continued to expand the
scope of the computer crime law ... and then passed the National Information Infrastructure Protection
Act of 1996 (NIIPA)... [O]ne important change effectuated by the 1996 Act was the substitution of the
term "protected computers," for "federal interest computers," throughout the statute. Previously, the
1994 Act only covered crimes involving computers located in more than one state. Because "protected
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 14
For virus authors, the relevant portion of NIIPA is section 1030(a)(5), which
criminalizes knowingly causing the transmission of a program, code, or command
with the intent to cause damage. 89 Sections 1030(a)(5)(B) and (C) criminalize the
intentional accessing of a computer in excess of one's authority,90 and causing
damage as a result of that conduct, regardless of intent. Therefore, "unauthorized
users, such as hackers who cause the transmission of malevolent software, including
viruses, are responsible even if the transmission was not intentional, but only
reckless or negligent."9' The newest version of the legislation removes some of the
possible defenses a virus author could raise under earlier versions regarding
jurisdiction, intent, and the amount of damages she was required to inflict.92
For the United States, the Melissa virus concluded with "the first successful
prosecution of a virus author in over a decade and only the second successful
prosecution in [American] history" 93 under the nation's specialized computer crime
statutes. As a result of an extensive search, the virus author, David Smith, was
apprehended within a few days of Melissa's appearance. 94 He pled guilty to state95
computers" includes those used in interstate commerce or communications, the statute now protects any
computer attached to the Interet, even if all the computers involved are located in one state.
Id.
89. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(8)(A)-(D) (2000)."Damage" is defined as follows:
(8) any impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or information, that
(A) causes loss aggregating at least $5,000 in value during any one year period to one or more
individuals;
(B) modifies or impairs, or potentially modifies or impairs, the medical examination, diagnosis,
treatment, or care of one or more individuals;
(C) causes physical injury to any person; or
(D) threatens public health or safety. ...
Id.
90. "[The term 'exceeds authorized access' means access to a computer without authorization and to use
such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accessor is not entitled so to obtain or alter." 18
U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6).
91. Nicholson, supra note 49, at 215.
92. See id. at 216-17 (explaining how the prior versions of the 1996 Act did not technically criminalize
accessing a private sector, non-financial computer for the purpose of fraud from within the same state, due to
loopholes created by the language). The 1996 Act also removed available defenses regarding intent. Id. at 217.
Section 1030(a)(5)(C) now clearly requires only an intent to access, not an intent to cause damage. Even
under the 1986 Act, the language was judicially interpreted by the Second Circuit in United States v.
Morris, 928 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1991), as requiring intent merely to access, not intent to cause damage.
The Ninth Circuit also held that the lack of a mens rea requirement for causing damage was
constitutional. Thus, once a prosecutor proves intentional access, courts will reject a defense claiming
that the effects of a program exceeded the programmer's intentions.
Id.; see also Sinrod & Reilly, supra note 7, at 220 (discussing new changes to federal cyber crime statues with
regard to the element of intent). A prosecutor is no longer required to prove a culprit's intent to harm; now a
prosecutor must only prove intent to access files in an unauthorized way. Id
93. Sinrod & Reilly, supra note 7, at 219.
94. See Whitworth & Kennedy, supra note 57 (reporting that a combination of amateur sleuths, investigators
from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and major Internet companies took part in "hunting" the culprit).
95. See Sinrod & Rielly, supra note 7, at 219 n.192 (reporting that Mr. Smith pled guilty to second-degree
computer theft under N.J.S.A. 2C:20-25).
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and federal charges of causing computer damage,9 6 which included an admission
that he was responsible for the eighty million dollars in damages to over a million
affected computers.97 Smith is still awaiting sentencing for the crime, 9 despite being
found guilty in late 1999. 99 He could receive several years in prison and a fine of
hundreds of thousands of dollars.1 t°
2. Countries with Lesser Computer Crime Laws
While the United States and other technology-dependent countries are drafting
sophisticated computer legislation, the majority of countries are not. Outbreaks of
damaging and fast-spreading viruses, such as Chernobyl and ILOVEYOU, are
illustrative of two countries that have inadequate criminal protection against the
spread of computer viruses.
When Chernobyl first surfaced in 1999, military authorities briefly questioned
its author, Chen Ing-hau, yet he evaded punishment because Taiwanese companies
failed to file complaints. 10' However, when the virus surfaced again in April of
2000, a Taiwanese resident filed criminal charges after the virus infected his
computer, 102 and Ing-hau was thereafter arrested by Taiwanese authorities.' 3 Since
Taiwan does not have a cyber crime law, the Bureau of Criminal Investigation
charged him with offenses of destruction and damage.104 If convicted, Ing-hau faces
a maximum sentence of three years.105
While Ing-hau's arrest is a positive step toward dealing with computer crime,
it falls short of the success that legislation specifically designed to combat computer
crime can accomplish. t°6 Taiwan depended on someone stepping forward to file
formal charges,'0 7 fortunately giving the country a second opportunity to prosecute
96. See id. at219 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2),(5)(A) (2000) as the applicable fedenl statute under which
Smith pled guilty).
97. Id.
98. As of the time of this Comment's publication, Smith had not yet been sentenced.
99. See Jo Ticehurst, 7 Days; Cybercrime is Unpunished, COMPUTnNG, Dec. 14, 2000, at 6, available at
LEXIS, News Library, COMPTG File (espousing the fear that "new kinds of crimes can fall between the cracks,"
causing many cyber crimes to go unpunished in many countries due to gaps in national criminal laws).
100. See Whitworth & Kennedy, supra note 58.
101. See Sylvia Dennis, Chernobyl Virus Author Arrested in Taiwan, NEwsnYTEs, Sept. 18, 2000. "He
subsequently won a job at a software company on the back of his infamy." Id.; see also Whitworth & Kennedy,
supra note 59 (explaining that Ing-han's infamous virus actually brought him acclaim in Taiwan). "'[Hie is treated
as a national hero,' Jan Hruska, technical director of Sophos, the anti-virus specialists ofAbingdon, Oxfordshire,
said." Id.
102. See Taivan Prosecutes, supm note 68 (describing how a Taiwan resident was prompted to file criminal
charges against Ing-hau when the virus struck again on April 26, 2000 and his personal computer was infected).
103. Dennis, supra note 101.
104. Taiwan Prosecutes, supra note 68.
105. See id.
106. See, e.g., supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text (describing NIPA, the U.S. law that is specifically
designed to combat computer crime).
107. See supra note 102.
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the virus author. If a law existed that defined Ing-hau' s act of intentionally releasing
a computer virus onto the Internet as criminal, the government could have
prosecuted him over a year earlier, instead of being forced to wait for a civil
complaint to surface.
When the ILOVEYOU virus surfaced in May 2000, the Philippines found itself
in a situation similar to Taiwan's: an apprehended culprit but no adequate criminal
statute under which to charge him. The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
charged Onel de Guzman, the suspected author of the "Love Bug,"' 8 with theft,
malicious intent, and violation of the Philippines Access Devices Regulation Act, 109
which carries penalties of six to twenty years imprisonment. 0 The Department of
Justice Panel reviewed the case and was left with no alternative but to clear De
Guzman of all charges because a prima facie case could not be established."1 One
of the member-prosecutors of the three-man panel commented that the charges of
theft and malicious intent were bound to fail because "the NBI failed to provide
evidences of the suspect's intent to gain or inflict injury."11 2 Philippine authorities
released de Guzman, and dismissed his formal charges due to a lack of evidence and
a lack of a specific law criminalizing computer hacking. 3
The Philippines' embarrassment following the release of this cyber criminal
motivated the government to quickly write and pass the Electronic Commerce Act
of 2000,14 legislation that could have facilitated de Guzman's prosecution if it had
108. See Philippines: 'Love Bug' Suspect Gets Off the Hook, CoMPuTERWORLD PHILPPINEs, Aug. 28, 2000,
available at 2000 WL 9787658 [hereinafter Philippines: 'Love Bug'] (naming Onel de Guzman as the suspected
author of the Love Bug). At the time of the incident, de Guzman was a 23-year-old computer student of AMA
Computer College. Id.
109. See Luz Baguioro, Philippines Indicts 'Love Bug'Suspect, STRAIrs TIMES (SINGAPORE), June 30,2000,
available at 2000 WL 2978251 (naming the National Bureau of Investigation and a local Internet service provider
as the organizations that brought the formal charges against de Guzman).
110. "Love Bug" Sparks Demand, supra note 73.
111. See Philippines: 'Love Bug,' supra note 108 (confirming that the Department of Justice of the
Philippines cleared de Guzman of all charges in a resolution approved by Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuno
in late August 2000).
112. Id.
113. See id. (quoting Archimedes Manabat, one of the member-prosecutors of the three-man Department of
Justice panel that reviewed the case as stating that the "e-commerce law cannot be enforced because it was ratified
after the hacking was done").
114. See Melvin G. Calimag, 5 Asian Countries Now Have E-Commerce Laws, METROPOLITAN COMPUTER
TIMES, June 15,2000 (reporting that the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 is based on the Model Law on Electronic
Commerce, drafted by the United Nations Commission for International Trade Law (UNICITRAL)). The article
also quoted Guillermo Luz of the Makati Business Club: "We're surprised, but happy. I think the House of
Representatives did an extraordinary thing of passing the bill in the 2nd and 3rd reading on the same day." Id. A
complete copy of the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 is on file with The Transnational Lawyer; see also
Philippines: New Law Paves Way For E-Transactions, COMPUTERWORLD PHILIPPINES, June 30, 2000, available
at 2000 WL 9787565 (marveling at how, just two years after it was conceptualized, "both the Senate and the House
of Representatives ratified the bicameral conference committee report on the proposed E-Commerce Act, all within
June 2000, barely making it before the closing of the second regular session of the 1 lth Congress").
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been in place at the time he committed his act."l5 Although the new piece of
legislation came too late to adequately handle the ILOVEYOU disaster, the
Philippines is now equipped to deal with such a problem should it arise again.
Although the Philippines is now prepared to combat cyber crime, other virus
havens"t6 continue to exist around the world. Passing the Electronic Commerce Act
of 2000, ensured that the Philippines would no longer be one of these havens, but
this is not sufficient to deal with the global threat cyber crimes present. A
coordinated international solution is required.
Im. THE PROBLEM: ENFORCEMENT AND EXTRADITION
Today, countries worldwide are learning the hard way that their domestic laws
are inadequate when attempting to prosecute virus authors located on foreign soil. " 7
"[C]yberspace has no geographic or political boundaries..118 The ease with which
viruses spread allows virus authors to perpetrate their criminal conduct in one
country and simply watch their handiwork spread across national boundaries. Recent
Internet virus outbreaks 9 and the difficulties many countries faced attempting to
115. See Luz Baguioro, Philippines Approves Bill on Cyber-Crimes, STRAITS TIMES (Singapore), June 9,
2000, available at 2000 WL 2975454 (outlining the fine and jail terms provided by the Electronic Commerce Act
for computer hacking and other cyber attacks). "The Bill ... aims to plug the hole that hampered Manila's efforts
to prosecute those suspected of creating and spreading the Love Bug computer virus." Id.; see also Philippine
President Signs E-Commerce Law, DEUTSCHE PRESsE-AGENTuR, June 14,2000 (quoting President Joseph Estrada
as saying that "[ilt is indeed unfortunate that the country's good name suffered unfairly in the wake of the infamous
ILOVEYOU virus. This law provides fines and penalties for computer hackers-a three year imprisonment and a
minimum fine of 100,000 pesos (2,400 dollars)." Id.
116. See supra notes 101-13 and accompanying text (illustrating how Taiwan and the Philippines became
"havens" for two virus authors who evaded prosecution because the country authorities found them and did not have
adequate cyber crime laws).
117. This is only when countries have not resorted to international cooperation.
118. Nicholson, supra note 49, at 250; see also Reno v. A.C.L.U., 521 U.S. 844, 851 (1997) (defining
cyberspace as a "unique medium... located in no particular geographic location but available to anyone, anywhere
in the world, with access to the Internet").
119. See supra notes 59-78 and accompanying text (discussing the outbreaks of the computerviruses Melissa,
Chernobyl, and ILOVEYOU). This Comment addresses Internet virus outbreaks occurring only between the dates
of 1999 and 2000. For discussion surrounding viruses occurring in 2001, see Bob Sullivan, MSNBC, Melissa
Variant Targets Macintosh (Jan. 18, 2001), at http:llwww.msnbc.com/news/518157.asp (copy on file with The
Transnational Lawyer) (reporting a new strain of the Melissa virus specifically targeting Macintosh computers).
"The new virus is tricky because it attacks Microsoft Word 2001 for Macintosh files, a new file format many
antivirus products can't quite handle yet." Id.; MSNBC, Password-Stealing Virus Hits AOL (Feb. 1, 2001), at
http://www.msnbe.com (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (reporting the revival of an old virus that has
been given "new life"). "The strand that is currently making the rounds spreads through AOL e-mail and infects
files on users' systems while attempting to collect and steal AOL v4.0 and v5.0 account numbers and passwords."
Id.; Bob Sullivan, MSNBC, Italian 'Love Bug' Hits Euro Firms, (Feb. 8, 2001), at
http:llwww.msnbc.comlnews/527791.asp (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (reporting a new Italian
version of the "Love Bug" is hitting companies in Europe); Robert Lemos, MSNBC, Dutch Arrest 'Kournikova'
Suspect (Feb. 14,2001), at http:llwww.msnbc.com/news/529834.asp (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer)
(reporting that Dutch police "arrested and released a man who confessed responsibility for writing the Anna
Kournikova virus that inconvenienced thousands of Internet users"). The charges against the 20 year-old suspected
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bring the responsible authors to justice demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the current
international system. It is evident that only laws which transcend physical
boundaries can remedy this ongoing problem.
A. Enforcement Problems
Although countries like the United States drafted specially-tailored laws to aid
in the prosecution of computer crimes, very few indictments have actually
resulted. 120 One reason for this prosecutorial lag may be that until 1996, prosecution
under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act depended on the type of computer that the
virus affected. 12' Another reason may be that those who own statutorily protected
computers often do not report security problems for fear that it would spotlight the
vulnerability of their computers and cause them to lose business.122 In addition, there
is the difficulty inherent in tracking down a culprit.F23 This may be attributable to
both the ease with which one can maintain anonymity on the Internet 24 and the lack
of specially trained or experienced agents skilled to investigate complex computer
author for damaging private property and computer programs were insufficient to keep him incarcerated. Id. "The
virus itself is relatively benign; its payload executes only once a year, on Jan. 26, when it redirects victims' Internet
browsers to a Web page in the Netherlands. But because it makes so many copies of itself, it can shut down
corporate e-mail servers." Id.
120. See Nicholson, supra note 49, at231 (discussing how unsuccessful the United States has been in bringing
cyber criminals to justice).
The unamended version of the 1984 Computer Abuse Act resulted in only one prosecution. Between
January 1989 and April 1993, there were only seventy-six convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 1030. A study
of fifty such cases revealed that more than half were convictions for general fraud under §1030(a)(4).
The number of such prosecutions reached 174 as of June 1996.
Id.
121. See id. (discussing how the restriction ofthe Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to actions affecting "federal
interest computers" could have influenced the low number of prosecutions).
One important change effectuated by the 1996 Act was the substitution of the term "protected
computers," for "federal interest computers," throughout the statute. Previously, the 1994 Act only
covered crimes involving computers located in more than one state. Because "protected computers"
includes those used in interstate commerce or communications, the statute now protects any computer
attached to the Interet, even if all the computers involved are located in one state.
Id.
122. See Carl Benson et al., Computer Crimes, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 409, 422 (1997) (asserting that the
vulnerability of its computer systems to the public often deters private corporations from reporting security
breaches). "[O]wners... may preferto handle security problems themselves to avoid the embarrassment of a public
trial focusing on the vulnerability of their computers." Id.
123. See India, supra note 78 (intimating that the most difficult challenge is identifying the culprit). "As the
Net can be accessed from any part of the globe, the field is wide open for hackers. At present, there are an estimated
198 million Net connections." Id.; see also Brce Braun et al., WWW.Commerical_Terrorism.com: A Proposed
Federal Criminal Statute Addressing the Solicitation of Commercial Terrorism Through the Internet, 37 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 159,175 (2000) (discussing how anonymity on the web is still relatively easy to maintain). For example,
logging on to a computer from a cyber caf6 or library can make it almost impossible for police to track down a
culprit who uses such a public terminal for criminal activity. Id. For most Internet connections, because users need
not provide identification to log on, investigators encounter additional tracking difficulties. Id.
124. Id.
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crimes."z Together these factors prevent countries from bringing perpetrators of
computer-related crimes to justice.
Inability to quickly apprehend a perpetrator may also result in enforcement
problems. When a search is underway for a cyber criminal, countries depend on the
assistance of the international community. More often than not, countries are unable
to respond quickly to each other, causing setbacks to a fast-paced investigation.
126
When a country is forced to request international assistance to handle a developing
situation the complex nature of the legal process or a lack of amicable relations
between countries sometimes causes a loss of momentum. These types of
impediments can result in suspending an entire investigation for weeks, sometimes
months. 27 Most countries agree that eliminating the time-consuming red tape that
often interferes with an investigation is necessary to ensure a more rapid response
to cyber events.1
28
Although chronologically, Melissa was one of the first major viruses to appear
on the Internet, Melissa is an outstanding illustration of effective cooperation
between law enforcement and the Internet community. David Smith was identified
through the collaborative efforts of private companies, individual Internet users in
Sweden and the United States,' 29 America Online, and federal and state law
enforcement. 1
30
125. See infra note 186 and accompanying text (presenting the main reason why law enforcement agencies
have difficulty recruiting individuals with the specialized technological backgrounds).
126. See, e.g., Margret Johnston, International Panel Testifies on Cyber Attacks, SUNWORLD, Aug. 2000,
available at LEXIS, News Library, SUNWLD File (explaining how "an international panel of computer security
officials told a U.S. congressional committee that a quicker response to cyber attacks is needed both between
countries and between government and private industries").
127. See id. (providing a statement by Ohad Genis, an Israeli police representative who is also the advocate
and chief inspector of the National Unit for Fraud Investigations). While participating in the international panel of
computer security officials, Genis voiced his concern that the response from other countries in computer crime
investigations is too slow. Id. As an example, Genis cited a situation that took place during a recent round of Middle
East peace negotiations at Camp David. Id.
[The Israeli police continuously received information that there were Internet sites calling for the
assassination of Israel's Prime Minister Ehud Barak. The Israeli authorities had to go through long
procedures to try to identify the people responsible for the Net threats. In order to obtain the names of
the users who use specific IP (Internet Protocol) address[es] we still have to wait weeks and months.
Id.
128. See, e.g., id. (describing the position ofJuergen Maurer, the detective chief superintendent of the German
Federal Police, who also participated on the international panel of computer security officials that reported to a U.S.
Congressional committee). "[G]erman authorities dealt with the U.S. National Infrastructure Protection Center
(NIPC) in only one case ... that occurred in February. That case showed that, even though the cooperation was very
good, there is still a need to establish a more efficient and effective way of exchanging information." Id. Maurer
stressed the importance offorging cooperative partnerships with thesystem administrators of the affected companies
that fall prey to cyber crimes as a way to obtain required information. Id. "[A]ccess to the desired data should be
possible without having to go through the time-consuming formalities underlying international law .... Id.
129. See WWW.CommercialTerrorism.Com, supra note 123, at 178 (explaining that the individual users in
Sweden and the United States were a computer science student and a computer engineering student, respectively).
130. See id. "The unusual collaborators pinpointed the origin of the offending virus to a single telephone line
in New Jersey." Id.
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Before concluding that Smith's successful prosecution is a result of seamless
international cooperation, the underlying circumstances require a closer look. The
success and ease with which Smith was apprehended may be due to his choice of
authoring Melissa in the United States and remaining in the country until
apprehended. The United States, a country with a specialized cyber crime law firmly
in place,131 was well-equipped statutorily to handle the situation once Smith was
caught. If Smith had authored Melissa in a country without a cyber crime law or fled
to one after releasing the virus, it is less likely he would have been prosecuted.
32
Lack of extradition treaties also aid virus authors in escaping the not-so-long arm
of the law.
B. Extradition
Extradition t33 and laws governing computer crimes share a common
characteristic: both are "hopelessly outdated and therefore, lagging behind the forces
they are trying to regulate."'134 Certain aspects of computer crime legislation are
particularly incompatible with extradition. 135 Some countries liberally interpret
treaties to allow for extradition while others such as the United States require more
formal arrangements.
136
While the United States has entered into numerous treaties with countries all
over the globe, 137 U.S. extradition arrangements share many basics traits. The traits
131. See Sinrod &Reilly, supra note 7, at219 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2), (5)(A) as the applicable federal
statute under which Smith pled guilty).
132. See supra notes 101-13 and accompanying text (describing instances where virus authors escaped
punishment because the jurisdictions in which they were found did not have adequate laws).
133. See Soma, supra note 12, at 318 (espousing that "the process ofextradition can be defined simply as the
surrendering of a criminal or accused criminal by one sovereign to another").
134. Id. at 317-18.
135. See id. (examining the inability of extradition law to promptly respond to changes in criminal law,
particularly with respect to computer crime).
136. See id. at 322 (describing how "the United States, following international custom, requires formal
extradition treaties").
137. See id. (noting that the United States is party to over 100 extradition treaties with various nations around
the world).
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relevant to the extradition of cyber criminals are reciprocity,"' a treaty, 39 and
double criminality.
140
Reciprocity is more a function of one nation's goodwill toward another, rather
than a technical treaty provision.141 Reciprocity rests on the notion that if one nation
honors another country's request for extradition, the requesting nation will do
likewise when the situation is reversed.142 Reciprocity is most often a critical factor
when no treaty exists between the two countries. 43 However, countries such as the
United States that require an actual treaty to be in place for any extradition, will
always refuse extradition to a country with whom it has no treaty, regardless of
goodwill considerations.'"
"Double criminality requires that the offense charged be considered criminal in
both the requesting and requested jurisdictions."'145 Originally, the double criminality
provision in a treaty stood for securing fundamental rights for the individual. 47
Now it functions as a loophole that allows computer criminals to escape
prosecution. 4 8 Although most nations agree that spreading computer viruses should
be illegal, extradition is difficult because of disagreement over the severity of
punishment and precisely what is regulated. 49
138. See id. (defining reciprocity as "the notion that one sovereign will surrender fugitives so long as its own
requests for fugitives will be honored"); see also id. at 318 n.2 (citing M. Cherif Bassiouni, International
Extradition and World Public Order 1 (1974) as warning that reciprocity should not be confused with double
criminality). "While double criminality creates mutual obligations, it should not be confused with reciprocity. Where
reciprocity creates an expectation that the requesting state shall equally honor similar future requests, the doctrine
of double criminality contemplates similar crimes." Id. at 324 n.34.
139. See id. at 323 n.26 (explaining that not all countries follow U.S. policy of requiring formal treaties for
extradition). "For example, France and Switzerland statutorily provide for extradition where no treaty exists.
Common law countries, however, are more likely to require more formalistic treaty obligations." Id.; see generally
Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933) (interpreting international law as withholding a legal right to demand
extradition unless a treaty is in place); see also Valentine v. U.S. ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 9 (1936) (stating
that the U.S. Constitution prohibits extradition unless provided for by law or treaty).
140. See Soma, supra note 12, at 323 n.31 (explaining that double criminality is alternately referred to as
"dual criminality" by some scholars). Other basic characteristics of a typical U.S. extradition treaty include the
political offense exception, speciality, and procedural requirements. Id. at 322.
141. See generally, id. at 322-23 (describing the concept of reciprocity).
142. Id.
143. See id. at 323 (describing the instances when reciprocity plays the largest role in extradition
proceedings).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See id. (noting that every treaty to which the United States is a party includes some form of double
criminality language).
147. See id. at 324 (explaining that "[d]ouble criminality protects states' rights by promoting reciprocity and
also safeguards individual rights by shielding the individual from unexpected and unwarranted arrest and
imprisonment").
148. When a treaty requires that both countries consider the act criminal in order to extradite, a computer
criminal will not be subjected to extradition if one of the involved countries cannot prosecute the computer crime.
Id.
149. See Soma, supra note 12, at 346.
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Historically, extradition treaties listed extraditable offenses, ensuring that only
those particular crimes required a country to hand over a criminal.'50 A major
drawback of this approach is its inability to respond to substantive changes in the
law. Many countries realized this and amended existing extradition treaties to utilize
the "eliminative method," where actions are extraditable if under both countries'
laws the action carries a specified minimum level of punishment,15 1 usually one
year.
152
However, even the eliminative approach contains obstacles, particularly with
regard to computer crimes. When such novel crimes are at issue, it becomes
impossible to measure the length of a sentence under one country's law against
another country's because the latter may not consider the act criminal. 153 This
roadblock kept the United States from extraditing the ILOVEYOU virus author from
the Philippines.1 54 Although the majority of countries today criminalize computer
crimes, 155 the lack of legal uniformity causes serious extradition problems.
156
Regardless of the reason for the low number of computer crime prosecutions,
it is evident that the current difficulty countries around the world experience in
prosecuting virus authors needs correcting. It is no longer sufficient for countries to
act independently of one another, through legislation, investigation, or otherwise,
because the spread of a computer virus is not a crime likely to be contained within
one country. An international solution must be proposed and implemented in order
to make successful virus author prosecution a reality.
150. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 12, at 330 (noting that "treaties do not define these offenses but only name
them; and therefore, some body of substantive criminal law must be applied by the extradition magistrate to
determine whether the act committed constitutes a treaty offense"); see also Soma, supra note 12, at 323-26
(describing the list of specific offenses within an extradition treaty as the "enumerative approach").
151. See generally, BASSIOUNI, supra note 12, at 316-19 (explaining the "eliminative method" in detail).
152. See Soma, supra note 12, at 325 (specifying that "the required minimum sentence length refers to the
'potential' and not the 'actual' sentence").
153. See, e.g., supra notes 101-105 and accompanying text (describing how Taiwan had no computer crime
legislation in place when the author spread the Chernobyl virus).
154. See supra notes 73-78 and 105-10 and accompanying text (discussing the ILOVEYOU virus and its
author's escape of prosecution).
155. See Soma, supra note 12, at 351 n.212 (listing the prison sentences for some countries that criminalize
the unauthorized access of computers with the intent to alter or damage data, regardless of whether such damage
results). "Generally, the maximum imprisonment penalties are [as follows]: Australia-10 years; Canada-10 years;
Finland-i year; Germany-2 years; Japan-5 years; Netherlands-4 years; Sweden-2 years; U.K.-6 months; United
States-5 years." Id.
156. See, e.g., Soma, supra note 12, at 351 (describing how both U.S. and Australian law applied in United
States v. Morris). However, if the worm had affected a computer other than one belonging to the government, a
crime would only have been committed in the United States because Australian law only protects government
computers. Id.
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IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Most experts agree that it would be ideal if international cooperation existed to
facilitate the apprehension of virus authors. 157 Because the outbreak of a computer
virus is frequently a cross-border incident, only an international or a uniform
approach to the problem can expedite the task of bringing offenders to justice. While
no consensus exists as to what is the best method, some proposed solutions have
surfaced. These solutions include adopting amendments to domestic legislation to
better facilitate extradition, implementing a global cyber crime police unit, and
building stronger centralized government. Others, however, advocate government
deregulation. The Council of Europe's multilateral draft Cyber-Crime Treaty
comprises a final proposed solution to increase the apprehension and prosecution of
virus authors.
A. Facilitation of Extradition
One way to facilitate extradition is to change a nation's laws to provide for
extradition in the absence of a specific treaty being in place. At the domestic level,
language could be added to existing extradition laws to afford more guarantees in
the extradition of computer criminals. 5 8 If the United States inserted such language
into existing legislation, it might read: "The offenses defined herein shall be
considered extraditable offenses so long as the Requesting State possesses
equivalent legislation and the Requesting State agrees to reciprocate when presented
with any similar requests made by the government of the United States."'' 59 Such a
clause allows extradition even in the absence of an extradition treaty or with an
enumerative treaty that does not specifically address computer crimes.160 It would
also allow extradition for crimes, such as the spread of computer viruses, when most
countries recognize the act as criminal but differ in opinion as to appropriate levels
157. See generally World's Richest Countries Call for Web Security Standards, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSII,
Oct. 26, 2000, available at LEIXS, News Library, AFPFR File (stating that "Internet experts from the world's
wealthiest countries attending a conference on cyberspace crime ... recommended international security standards
to protect users"); see also Keith Nuthall, Confounding Cyber-Crime, COMPUTER WKLY., Apr. 15, 1999, at 30,
available at LEXIS, News Library, ASAPIN File (proposing that "[t]he fight against computer crime requires an
international response. Offences are often carried out from a remote site and possibly in a different country to the
victim"); see also 'Love Bug' Sparks Demand, supra note 73 (relaying the U.S. government's request that "a world
summit be held to get countries to cooperate in protecting vital installations and companies from virulent virus
attacks"); see also EDS Chairman and CEO Dick Brown Promotes Cyber Security at Global Business Dialogue;
Brown Says Secure Internet is Key to Future of Digital Economy, PR NEwswIRE, Sept. 26, 2000 (setting forth the
Global Business Dialogue on Electronic Commerce's observations and policy recommendations to all governments
"to promote a cooperative and international industry-to-government and government-to-government effort to
enhance cyber security and to fight cyber crime").
158. See, e.g., Soma, supra note 12, at 360-62 (explaining how amendments to U.S. legislation might be a
way to facilitate extradition).
159. Id. at 360.
160. See id. at 361.
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of punishment. There is evidence that this concept might work in countries that have
already added similar legislative provisions. 161 If the United States, which currently
lacks such language in its extradition laws, followed suit, extradition for computer
crimes would immediately be possible with a number of countries. 12 A U.S. citizen,
however, could not be extradited to a nation that did not have equivalent
legislation. 1
63
Amending legislation facilitates the prosecution of virus authors, but it does not
solve the problem; some computer crimes may still fall outside extradition's reaches.
For example, stronger extradition legislation is not helpful where the requesting
country views the act in question as criminal, but the requested country does not."M
Inconsistencies in the criminalization of particular conduct is especially likely with
crimes such as adult pornography and dangerous speech. 161 It is unlikely that a
country would go to the extreme of amending the legislation simply to achieve the
narrow result of facilitating extradition in the area of computer viruses.66 In
addition, simply amending extradition laws may realistically fail due to the depth
of the digital divide that exists in today's world. "In a world where 1.2 billion people
161. See, e.g., id. (describing the Commonwealth Scheme and the U.K. Computer Misuse Act).
Mhe Commonwealth Scheme provides for extradition between the members of the British
Commonwealth without specific treaties. This scheme links over thirty States, including Great Britain,
Australia, New Zealand, Canada, India, and the West Indies. The U.K. Computer Misuse Act, followed
by some of the countries in the Commonwealth Scheme, already includes extradition language.
Accordingly, the extradition of criminals in other Commonwealth countries is already possible among
the participants. Id.
For a detailed discussion of the Commonwealth Scheme, see SHEARER, supra note 12, at 54-57.
162. Id. If the United States were to adopt the language of the Commonwealth Scheme described above, it
could then engage in reciprocal extradition with nations that are signatories to the Scheme.
163. See Soma, supra note 12, at 361.
164. See id. (discussing why extradition language in legislation is of no use in areas such as Internet adult
pornography, dangerous speech, and national security).
['rihe inclusion of extradition language would not be helpful in those areas lacking international
agreement on criminality ... because extradition cannot occur if the requested country and the
requesting country disagree as to whether a behavior should be criminalized. For example, although
added extradition language to the federal obscenity statute would establish double criminality in
countries possessing equivalent legislation, it would not expand the number of countries willing to
extradite for this offense. Similarly, in the category of dangerous speech, extradition would not be
perfected to countries wishing to prosecute for speech offenses because the United States does not
criminalize most speech .... [I]n some areas, such as national security, the inclusion of extradition
language is wholly improper. National security is a national matter. Accordingly, seeking the inclusion
of extradition language in such legislation could offend principles of sovereignty.
Id. at 362.
165. See id.
166. For further discussion surrounding other computer crimes in the context of extradition, see generally,
Soma, supra note 12.
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live on less than $1 a day,"' 67 the problems associated with computers and malicious
codes are trivial and irrelevant to many countries. 68
An alternative way to facilitate extradition is to amend the treaties themselves,
both the substantive and procedural sections, to include computer crimes. As
previously discussed, most of the older U.S. treaties list specific offenses that are
extraditable, rather than use the newer eliminative method. 69 Practical application
of this solution would force lawmakers to consider amending each of the vast
number of extradition treaties the United States already has in place. 1
70
Changing existing treaties or legislation to facilitate extradition is theoretically
noteworthy. However, the diversity among national laws on computer crimes
forewarn that this solution is of little real merit as it would leave open too many
gaps. In sum, "[s]tronger treaties and a uniformity of computer crime laws must
evolve before extradition will ever become a truly effective mechanism for
permitting apprehension and prosecution of international computer criminals."
' 17
'
B. Varying Levels of Cooperation Between Law Enforcement and the Private
Sector
Both law enforcement and the private sector have an interest in combating
computer crimes. Separately, the ability of law enforcement and the private sector
to combat cyber crime is limited.1 72 Some believe, however, that a cooperative effort
between the two is the most effective way of preventing and apprehending
perpetrators of cyber crime. '73 Many organizations and global leaders have voiced
the need for the implementation of such a solution. 174
167. Alan Boyle, MSNBC, Debating the World's Digital Gap (Oct. 18, 2000), at http://www.msnbc.
com/news/478319.asp?cp 1=1 (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
168. See id. (reporting a speech made by Bill Gates, Microsoft Chairman, on "Creating Digital Dividends"
in Seattle, Washington in October 2000).
Gates noted that [his self-established charitable] foundation's giving pattern was weighted about 60
percent toward health-oriented projects and 30 percent toward educational and library-related projects-
and he said public health had to take priority in aid programs for the developing world. He cited figures
indicating that millions of children die every year from age-old diseases that could have been prevented
by existing vaccines. "I am suggesting that if somebody is interested in equity, you wouldn't want to
spend more than 20 percent of your time talking about computers," he said.
Id.
169. See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text (contrasting the eliminative and numerative methods of
drafting treaties).
170. See Soma, supra note 12, at 323 (describing how the United States is a party to over 100 extradition
treaties around the world).
171. Id. at 369.
172. See infra notes 182-83 and accompanying text (postulating the shortcomings of law enforcement
working to combat cyber crime without the aid of the private sector and vice versa).
173. See, e.g., infra notes 178-81 and accompanying text (outlining the cooperative efforts on Interpol and
AtomicTangerine to combat cyber crime).
174. See, e.g., infra notes 175-76 (describing two instances of outcry for a cooperative effort between law
enforcement and the private sector).
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Former U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno is not alone in believing that
"increased cooperation between law enforcement and industry 1 75 is the surest way
to effectively handle identifying, locating, and punishing cyber criminals. Reno
acknowledged the government's shortcomings in technical ability, pointing out that
federal agents are quite aware that the increasing complexity of cyber crimes is
exceeding the ability of law enforcement agencies to prosecute them. 176 Without
assistance from the private sector, government investigators are at a disadvantage. 177
Interpol, "the world's pre-eminent organization supporting the prevention and
detection of international crime,"' 78 made the idea of cooperation between the public
and private sector a reality. Interpol worked directly with AtomicTangerine, a
consulting "powerhouse," to create an innovative alliance between the private and
public sector. 79 Interpol and AtomicTangerine "initiated a special relationship
designed to deliver advanced intelligence collected by the law enforcement
organization to corporations worldwide."' 80 Basically, law enforcement gives to the
private sector the technological advancements aimed at protecting computer systems
175. See Steve Ulfelder, Don't Tread on IT, CoMPuTERWORLD, Aug. 28, 2000, at 40, available at LEXIS,
News Library, COMPTG File (recalling Former U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno's opinion that the federal
government lacks the sophistication and technical resources that IT corporations possess, and that only cooperation
between corporate entities and the government can ensure the United States' ability to prosecute cyber criminals).
Janet Reno issued this opinion in June, 2000, according to a Computervorld report on June 19, 2000. Id.
176. See id.; see also Nuthall, supra note 157, at 30 (discussing how the U.K. is also addressing the lack of
IT expertise within a police force).
A liaison unit has been set up between the Association of Chief Police Officers and a group of Internet
service providers, which has now broadened its remit, and staged seminars open to all computer
professionals across the UK. The Serious Fraud Office employs 170 investigators to crack complex
cases-many of which involve the use of computers, while the Metropolitan Police runs a 10-strong
Computer Crime Unit.
Id.
177. See id.
178. Interpol and AtomicTangerine Announce Unique Alliance to Arrest the Multi-Billion Dollar Online
Crime Wave, PR NEwSwIRE, June 30, 2000.
179. Id.
180. Id. (describing the innovative alliance between Interpol and Menlo Park-based venture consulting firm,
AtomicTangerine, that will give companies worldwide "new access to superior intelligence in their war against
global cyber crime"). Thejoumey that led to this unprecedented alliance began in May 2000 at the Internet Defense
Summit in the Silicon Valley, where top executives from American and European industry heard the Interpol
Secretary-General warn that the private sector must defend itself because government agencies do not have the
technology to do the job, and pledge Interpol cooperation for the fight. Id.
'Private sector companies have a responsibility to their stakeholders and to the public at large to protect
their Internet activities,' said Interpol Secretary-General Rayond Kendall and AtomicTangerine CEO
Jonathan Fornaci in a joint statement. 'Assistance by Interpol can contribute to the private sector's
essential self-defense. At the same time, information gathered by some private companies may be of
substantial assistance to government agencies.' AtomieTangerine is an independentVenture Consulting
firm founded at SRI International, formerly known as Stanford Research Institute. AtomicTangerine's
mission is to apply the disciplines of venture capital, technology innovation and strategic consulting to
create category killers and incubate new industries. Headquartered in the San Francisco Bay Area,
AtomicTangerine has more than 225 employees in eleven offices worldwide.
Id.
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from outside attacks. The private sector reciprocates by sharing helpful information
it gathers, such as user profiles, to government agencies.' 8'
While voluntary cooperation between the public and private sectors is a practical
solution in theory, it may not be plausible on an international scale. For example,
many U.S. corporations do not like the idea of cooperating with law enforcement in
criminal investigations, fearing that turning over information may breach privacy
agreements they have with their customers. 82 These concerns will continue even if
the government tightened its regulations and mandated cooperation during computer
crime investigations.1 8
3
C. Stronger Governments
Some government efforts do not require help from the private sector to combat
computer crime. In fact, several do not believe that public and private sector
cooperation is the solution at all.184 The public sector strongly believes it must
recruit individuals that possess the necessary computer skills, whether they are
would-be hackers 85 or corporate computer professionals, 186 to use their talents to
combat cyber criminals' technological superiority. One example of this
181. See id.
182. See infra note 248 and accompanying text.
183. See id.
184. See, e.g., Harrison, supra note 67 (describing how Germany believes that a specialized international
organization should be established to deal solely with international cyber crises).
185. See Ann Harrison, Warnings About Security Holes Abound at Def Con, SUNWORLD, Aug. 2000,
available at LEXIS, News Library, SUNWLD File (describing the address Arthur Money, CIO at the Pentagon,
gave during the opening session at the Def Con hackers convention). Money jokingly thanked audience members
for withholding attacks against the Pentagon's systems during the Y2K transition and appealed to attendees to use
their talents on behalf of the U.S. government. Id. Def Con, now in its eighth year, meets in Framingham each year
and has grown from "a small private party to a large hacker social event featuring workshops on exploitable
vulnerabilities, defense strategies and the latest in technology tools for the security community. It attracts hackers
from around the world whose refined skills bedevil administrators everywhere." Id. Officials from the U.S. Central
Investigation Agency, the National Security Agency, and the U.S. Department of Defense also attended the yearly
convention in June 2000. Id.
186. See generally Nuthall, supra note 157, at 30 (discussing the dilemma that companies and law
enforcement agencies are not adequately equipped to detect and apprehend criminals "operating on the cutting edge
of technical and business developments"). Cyber crime is growing and with it is the demand for police officers who
understand computers. Id. The clear solution is to recruit from the corporate sector so that the police force can
increase its arsenal of IT professionals. Id.
David Toddington, who runs his own company, warns that in Canada police resources are so stretched
that private sector victims of computer crime are sometimes told that their grievances cannot be
investigated. "If there is one message that you should be aware of,' Toddington says, 'it is that you are
on your own ... " Toddington explains that Canada is short of 20,000 IT professionals, while the figure
is closer to 200,000 in the U.S.
Id.
The main problem with the police forces' ability to recruit computer experts is that IT professionals earn higher
salaries working in the private sector and would rather not take a pay cut to work for the government. Id. "In the
private sector, IT professionals can command $140,000, while police salaries are usually closer to $60,000.
Inevitably there is a real pressure on trained officers to pursue more lucrative options." Id.
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"independent" approach is the new specialist squad based at the multi-agency
National High-Tech Crime Unit in London which targets computer criminals who
use the Internet to commit crimes across international borders. 87 The specialist unit,
to be set up in April 2001, consists of staff drawn from Customs, National Crime
Squad, and the National Criminal Intelligence Service.188 The United Kingdom
invested twenty-five million pounds toward implementing the Unit, a squad totaling
over eighty "cyber cops" based in regional police forces around England and
Wales. 8 9 The countries that attended the Group of Eight nations (G8) meeting in
Berlin in October 2000 discussed cyber crime and reached an agreement to fund "a
team dedicated to Internet crime to provide an instant response. . . ."'9 To
compliment this "strategic fight against crime," the British government committed
thirty-seven million pounds to fund a National Management Information System
(NMIS) for police forces in England and Wales. 191
NMIS will provide the police with a comprehensive information
management and analysis tool, 'joining-up' data held on the various
information technology systems from every force and area of police work.
The system will present this data in a consistent format so the whole range
of police business can be easily and reliably compared and analyzed across
the country.
192
The funding will also be used to help finance an international hotline to exchange
information regarding and facilitating investigations of cyber crimes. 93
Again, combating cyber crime by acquiring technological specialists to improve
the quality of computer investigations is noteworthy in theory, but not practical.
194
Individuals with specialized abilities are in demand and unlikely to accept positions
with government organizations when private corporations are willing to pay them
187. See generally John Revill, CyberCops to Lead WarAgainst Internet Crime, BIRMINGHAM POST, Nov.
14, 2000, at 6, available at LEXIS, News Library, BIRPST File.
188. See id. (reporting an announcement made by Home Secretary Jack Straw on Nov. 13, 2000).
189. See generally Rebecca Paveley, Elite Cyber Cops Will Tackle Internet Crime-80 Strong Squad to be Set
Up, THE JOURNAL (NEWCASTLE, UK), Nov. 14, 2000, at 14, available at LEXIS, News Library, THFJRN File.
"Each regional force will have at least one cyber cop to tackle Internet crime in their area." Id.
190. See Revill, supra note 187, at 6.
191. See generally New Hi-Tech Crime Investigators In #25Million Boost to Combat Cybercrime, HERMES,
Nov. 13,2000.
192. ld.
193. See Revill, supra note 187, at 6.
194. This Comment reflects the current economic trends.
2001 /Prosecuting Computer Virus Authors
relatively higher salaries. 95 Unless government agencies can increase the salaries
of such specialists, they will continue to surrender talent to the private sector.
D. Government Deregulation
The solution primarily advanced by the private sector is for government to
refrain from regulating computer crimes that cause security breaches, including
computer viruses. Only a minority of IT leaders think extensive government
involvement is the correct course of action.196 Corporate leaders are interested in
letting "technology flourish," and prefer that government "apply no more than a
light touch" to Internet security issues. 197
Those promoting less government regulation focus on the amount of time
allocated by legislators to deal with cyber problems such as computer viruses. Many
elected officials believe that "the machinery of government should only be deployed
to solve problems that the private sector cannot solve on its own,"'198 and some
private sectors agree.' 99 One scholar even suggested that allowing government to
obviate what private corporations could accomplish through their own security
research is almost harmful: forcing legislators to address issues that the private
sector can completely take care of itself, diverts the legislators attention from other
pressing matters. 2°° Another concern surrounding the criminalization of computer
acts is that legislators often misunderstand technology and thus struggle when
195. See Nuthall, supra note 157, at 30 (exposing IT security consultant David Toddington's concerns
surrounding Canada's shortage ofIT professionals in comparison to the number in the United States). "In the private
sector, IT professionals can command $140,000, while police salaries are usually closer to $60,000. Inevitably there
is real pressure on trained officers to pursue more lucrative options." Id.; see also Interpol Calls For Corporate
Help, NETWORK NEWS, May 17,2000, at 2, available at LEXIS, News Library, NETNEW File (quoting Interpol
Secretary General Raymond Kendall at the Internet Defense Summit as remarking that "[w]e cannot afford to
engage the technology, technicians and research resources necessary to find quick solutions to a relatively new
phenomenon").
196. See id. (pointing out that a minority ofIT leaders applaud such global efforts because they recognize that
one of the main issues facing IT is the inability to prosecute hackers). Alvin Boynton, manager of IT at
Intranets.com Inc. in Wobum, Massachusetts, and others who attended the June COMPUTERWORLD Premier 100
Conference for IT Leaders point to the Love Bug as an example of how cyber criminals will get away if
international laws and agreements are not promulgated. Id.
197. Ulfelder, supra note 175, at 40 (providing that 89% of IT leaders at the June 2000 COMPUTERWORLD
Premier 100 Conference for IT Leaders believed security was the number one issue, but still preferred a limited role
(62%) or no role at all (14%) in U.S. federal government security). Only 21% preferred that the government play
a substantial role. Id. Seventy-one attendees completed a survey on government and IT). Id. Linda Rossetti, CEO
of Boston-based eMaven, Inc. added: "We're delighted for the [feds] interest .... [b]ut how solvable is the issue
politically? The data security problem is less about control than it is about education." Id. Linda Rossetti further
asserted that education on security practices and tools is best left to organizations and IT departments. Id.
198. Paul K. Ohm, On Regulating the Internet: Usenet, A Case Study, Comment, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1941,
1959 (1999).
199. See supra notes 196-206 and accompanying text, see also infra notes 237-59 and accompanying text
(discussing why many private sector and civil rights groups are opposed to government regulation of cyber crimes).
200. See Ohm, supra note 198, at 1959-60.
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developing solutions. 201 Lawmaking is already a long term process that desperately
tries to keep pace with evolving technology.2°2 In short, the slow process of
legislation and the quick growth and change of computer crime do not compliment
one another.
Opponents of government regulation also argue that individuals should be left
to settle their differences via tort actions. Providing remedies in tort for computer
virus infections may effectively deter further virus outbreaks.20 3 Since the "wide-
spread, non-uniform" damage caused by virus infections is similar to the personal
injuries suffered in other mass torts, it may be best handled by class action suits. 2°
Civil suits would target software companies and Internet service providers (ISPs),
giving them incentive to upgrade security and better screen the background of their
customers. "Because individuals are often judgment proof, software distributors and
on-line service providers present more lucrative targets and must adapt their
business strategies to offset this increased risk of liability. '20 5 Distributors and ISPs
who would bear the majority of the liability can protect themselves by acquiring20 6
liability insurance, making a contractual disclaimer, and developing secure computer
strategies.
In theory, holding ISPs and software distributors financially liable in civil tort
for the millions of dollars in damages caused by viruses is logical, because they are
in the best positions to shoulder the financial burden. In addition the ISP through
which the perpetrator spreads the virus onto the Internet can eliminate him as a
customer immediately and notify all other ISPs of his identity in order to avoid a
recurrence. However, assuring that those harmed are reimbursed for their damages
focuses more on the aftermath following a virus release and only contributes
marginally to deterring the perpetrator if he is judgment-proof. As earlier noted,
deterrence is a basic necessity.207 Without the threat of prison, little remains to deter
judgment-proof criminals. Furthermore, only providing victims a remedy in civil
tort20 s does nothing to bring the culprit to justice in the criminal forum.
201. See id. (expressing concern with legislators' abilities to comprehend the intricacies of computer crimes).
"Internet technology ... descriptions are often rife with complex acronyms and arcane networking concepts.
Lawmakers who do not understand the Internet space they are regulating tend to write laws that either fail to solve
the problem or injure the regulated space." Id.
202. See id.
203. See generally Robin A. Brooks, Deterring the Spread of Viruses Online: Can Tort Law Tighten the
'Net'?, 17 REV. LITIG. 343 (1998) (discussing the ability of tort liability to handle and adequately spread the costs
of damage caused by computer crime to ISPs and software distributors).
204. See id. at 345.
205. Id. at 346.
206. See id. at 346 n.8.
207. See DRESSLER, supra note 14, at 27-77 (providing a complete discussion about theories on deterring
punishment).
208. The U.S. statute that criminalizes computer crimes such as the spread of viruses allows for the victim
to bring a civil tort action against the author if the damage caused is over $5,000. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2000).
This is in addition to the criminal charges and serves as an incentive for private sector corporations to report these
security breaches to the authorities. See Nicholson, supra note 49, at 216.
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Regardless of whether a victim can recover monetary damages from a virus
attack, the problem of prosecuting the virus author is still not addressed. Allowing
for a civil remedy in tort is an important feature in computer law because it provides
companies with an incentive to report the attacks.209 However, authorities are still
at a disadvantage if there are no criminal laws under which to prosecute cyber
criminals. The difficulty of prosecution across international borders pervades
without the implementation of a uniform solution applicable to all countries around
the world.
E. The Council of Europe's Draft Cyber-Crime Treaty
An effort that solves the uniformity problem for any proposed solution to virus
crime is currently underway. "Forty-one countries stretching from Iceland to the
former Soviet republic of Georgia could be close to approving a treaty that would
fight cyber crime. '210 In response to the growing number of computer viruses, a
special committee of the Council of Europe,11 consulting with the U.S. Department
of Justice,212 proposed a convention "to harmonize cyber-crime laws and facilitate
international investigations. ' '213 The "Draft Convention on Cyber-Crime" (Draft
Treaty) includes, among other things, provisions dealing with illegal access and
interception of computerized information of any kind, including data and system
interference.214 Some provisions contained in the draft treaty limit the production,
distribution, and possession of the software used by hackers to exploit computer
vulnerabilities.1 5 The Treaty, still in its drafting phase, "will be the first ever
international treaty to address criminal behavior directed against computer systems,
209. See id. (discussing a remedy in tort for victims of computer crimes under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g)).
210. Paul Meller, Council of Europe to Discuss Cyber Crime Treaty, INFOWORLD DAILY NEWS, Nov. 22,
2000, available at LEXIS, News Library, INFDLY File.
211. See id. (mentioning that some members of the Council of Europe "automatically adopt Council treaties
once they are passed" while "[o]thers would be obliged to pass their own legislation to conform with the treaty");
see also Cybercrime Treaty Raises Regulatory, Privacy Concerns, INFO. SECURITY, June 2000, at 19, available at
LEXIS, News Library, INFSEC File [hereinafter Treaty Raises Concerns] (stating that "[t]he Council of Europe
consists of more than 40 signatory nations, including non-European countries such as the United States, Canada,
Japan, Russia and South Africa").
212. SeeRobertLemos, MSNBC, Coalition Slams Cybercrime Treaty (Oct. 19,2000), at http:llwww.msnbc.
com/news/478718.asp (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (explaining that "while the United States is
not a part of the 41-member Council of Europe, members from the U.S. Department of Justice and the FBI have
aided in the drafting of the treaty").
213. DorothyE. Denning, DisarmingtheBlackHats?, INFO.SEcuRrrY, Oct.2000, at 16, available atLEXIS,
News Library, INFSEC File.
214. See Treaty Raises Concerns, supra note 208, at 19 (adding that other provisions of the Draft Convention
on CyberCrime not relevant to this Comment address child pornography, computer-related forgery and fraud).
215. See Denning, supra note 213, at 16.
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networks or data and other types of similar misuse, 216 and may be signed as early
as mid-2001.t 7
1. The Relevant Provisions of the Treaty
The current draft of the Treaty, released on December 22, 2000, "attempts to
level the playing field throughout Europe by standardizing computer crime statutes
and requiring signatories to cooperate with one another."218 For example, the Draft
Treaty requires participating nations to make unathorized access2 19 and interference
of computer systems or communications 22° a criminal offense. Others criminalize the
production, sale, distribution, or other distribution of devices or computer programs
whose primary use is to access, intercept, or interfere with computer systems or
communications. 22  The Draft Treaty also requires signatory nations to hold
corporations liable for crimes committed by an employee holding a "leading
,,222position, and requires ISPs to collect data on their subscribers and make available
216. The Council of Europe, Draft Treaties, available at http://www.coe.int (copy on file with The
Transnational Lawyer).
217. See Patrick Thibodeau, European Cyber Treaty Raising Concerns, COMPUTERNWORLD, Dec. 11, 2000,
at 12, available at LEXIS, News Library, COMPTG File.
218. Lemos, supra note 212.
219. See Draft Convention on Cyber-Crime, Draft No. 25 Rev., Dec. 22, 2000, ch. 2, sec. 1, tit. 1, art. 2, at
http://www.coe.int (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) [hereinafter Draft Treaty] (stating that "[e]ach
party shall adopt such... measures... to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law when committed
intentionally the access to the whole or any part of a computer system without right ... ").
220. See id. at ch. 2, see. 1, tit. 1, art. 4, 5 (stating that "[elach party shall adopt such... measures.., to
establish as criminal offences under its domestic law when committed intentionally ... the damaging, deletion,
deterioration, alteration, or suppression of computer data without right," and "the serious hindering without right
of the functioning computer system by inputting, transmitting, damaging, deleting, deteriorating, altering or
suppressing computer data").
221. See id. at ch. 2, sec. 1, tit. 1, art. 6.
Each Party shall adopt such... measures ... to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law
when committed intentionally and without right:
a. the production, sale, procurement for use, import, distribution or otherwise making available of:
1. a device, including a computer program, designed or adapted primarily for the purpose of
committing any of the offences established in accordance with Article 2-5;
2. a computer password, access code, or similar data by which the whole or any part of a
computer system is capable of being accessed
with intent that it be used for the purpose of committing any of the offences established in Articles
2-5....
Id.
222. See id. at ch. 2, sec. 1, fit. 5, art. 12.
Each Party shall adopt... measures ... to ensure that a legal person can be held liable for a criminal
offence.., committed for its benefit by any natural person, acting either individually or as part of an
organ of the legal person, who has a leading position within the legal person, based on:
a. a power of representation of the legal person;
b. an authority to take decisions on behalf of the legal person;
c. an authority to exercise control within the legal person....
Id.
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such data to authorities.2 Signatories are also required to cooperate with other
jurisdictions to secure evidence224 and extradite persons charged with a computer
crime.
225
2. Supporters of the Treaty
Various global groups, including the G8 and the Council of Europe, believe that
treaties are the only way to align countries against cyber criminals.226 These entities
recognize that treaties create effective law enforcement and are pressing for treaties
that address data and computer crimes.227 Draft Treaty's call for the regulation of
"cyberweapons," such as hacking tools that have generally escaped regulation, has
been praised.228 "Cyberweapons control would establish a standard for behavior on
the Internet and provide a means for prosecuting offenders. Their enforcement could
curtail attacks and limit the damage by those brazen enough to violate the law.,
229
223. See id. at ch. 2, sec. 2, tit. 2, art. 16.
1. Each Party shall adopt such... measures ... to enable its competent authorities to order or similarly
obtain the expeditious preservation of [specified] computer data, that has been stored by means of a
computer system, in particular where there are grounds to believe that the computer data is particularly
vulnerable to loss or modification.
2. Where a Party gives effect to Paragraph 1 above by means of an order to a person to preserve
specified stored computer data in the person's possession or control, the Party shall adopt... measures
... to oblige that person to preserve and maintain the integrity of that computer data for an adequate
period of time, as necessary, to enable the competent authorities to seek its disclosure....
Id.
224. See id. at ch. 3, sec. 1, tit. 1, art. 24.
The Parties shall co-operate with each other, in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, and
through application of relevant international instruments on international co-operation in criminal
matters, arrangements agreed on the basis of uniform or reciprocal legislation, and domestic laws, to the
widest extent possible forthepurposes ofinvestigations orthe proceedings concerning criminal offences
related to computer systems and data, or for the collection of evidence in electronic form of a criminal
offence.
Id.
225. See id. at ch. 3, sec. 1, tit. 2, art. 25. "This article applies to extradition between Parties for the criminal
offenses established in . . .this Convention, provided that they are punishable under the laws of both Parties
concerned by deprivation of liberty for a maximum period of at least one year, or by a more severe penalty....
Id.
226. See Harrison, supra note 67.
227. Id.
228. See Denning, supra note 213, at 16 (comparing the possession and sale of "cyberweapons" to the
possession and sale of firearms).
In many countries, the use of cyber-weapons is now a crime, but the development, distribution and
acquisition of these tools remain legal (with the exception of tools that circumvent copyright protection
and clone cellular phones). By comparison, the possession, sale and transportation of firearms is highly
regulated by domestic laws and international treaties.
Id.
229. Id.
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The Draft Treaty eliminates many of the problems found with the other
proposed solutions previously discussed.30 For instance, the need to change
domestic legislationl or amend existing treaties232 in order to facilitate extradition
becomes irrelevant because the Draft Treaty contains provisions that ameliorate the
dilemma.3 The problem of facilitating cooperation between the public and private
sectors during criminal investigations is also solved by provisions in the treaty
making such cooperation mandatory for all signatories.' The same provision also
eliminates the complications involved in strengthening government agencies by
increasing the number of highly skilled technical investigators235 because all
involved work cooperatively236 In sum, the Draft Treaty surpasses the other
proposed solutions by resolving the prosecutorial problem in one effort as opposed
to a combination of many.
3. Opposition
Outright support is not the only response that the Council of Europe's Draft
Treaty received. Some have protested the Draft Treaty, arguing that this recent
attempt to remedy the inability of countries to effectively prosecute virus authors
leaves open too many gaps. 37 The opposition asserts that provisions may be over-
broad, thereby inadvertently over-regulating security software currently available
on the commercial market.23' Private companies are anxious because the Draft
Treaty contains what they consider burdensome mandates on ISPs to save and
possibly relinquish information regarding their customers .239 Tension also surrounds
the controversial assistance of the United States in the Treaty's drafting.24°
"European Union nations ... are about to make nearly any form of hacking -
even security research - illegal by treaty."24' Members of the private sector voiced
strong opposition to the Treaty.242 Currently, hacking for security research purposes
is legal in the United States.243 Professional network administrators fear the Draft
230. See generally supra notes 157-209 and accompanying text (outlining other solutions proposed to combat
the problem of prosecuting computer virus authors internationally).
231. See supra notes 158-63 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
233. See generally Draft Treaty, supra note 219.
234. See generally Draft Treaty, supra note 219.
235. Id.
236. See id.
237. See infra notes 241-47 and accompanying text.
238. See infra notes 243-47 and accompanying text.
239. See infra notes 248-51 and accompanying text.
240. See infra notes 252-59 and accompanying text.
241. Bob Sullivan, MSNBC, Cybercrime Treaty Targets Hackers (Oct. 24, 2000), at http:llwww/msnbc.
com/news/480734.asp (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
242. See, e.g., supra note 238 (discussing that the possibility of a restrictive treaty of this kind scares many
top European computer security experts).
243. See Sullivan, supra note 241.
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Treaty may chill security research. 244 It is necessary to discover possible security
breaches and alert others of potential dangers. 45 For the most part, the computer
software used to accomplish this type of research has the potential to be used for
illegal hacking.246 Some are concerned that the language in the current version of the
Draft Treaty may lead some countries to construe simple possession of such
software as intent of malicious activity.
247
Additionally, opponents are outraged that the Draft Treaty requires "internet
service providers and network administrators to help police by maintaining detailed
logs of all network activity,"248 a measure that at least one U.S. statesman bluntly
denounced.249 Some U.S. Senators repeatedly refuse to support any domestic
legislation that requires private sectors to cooperate with the government, 250 an
intentional goal of the Draft Treaty. One senator "cautioned security managers that
the federal government does not have adequate resources to prosecute security
attacks," and urged Congress not to pass legislation that forces companies to
cooperate with investigations.251
244. Seeid. (notingthattheDraftTreatyincludesaiding-and-abettingrules thatappeartomakethepublishing
ofsoftware vulnerabilities or exploits illegal). According to U.S.-based cyberlaw expertJennifer Granick, the Treaty
could make vulnerability mailing lists illegal. Id.
245. See, e.g., Bob Sullivan, MSNBC, High-Stakes Hacking, Euro-Style (Oct. 23, 2000), at
http://www.msnbc.com/news/479105.asp (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (noting that in Europe,
many computer security experts called "white hat" hackers find vulnerabilities and make their work public). A
"white hat" publishes the security flaws he discovers on his NTBugTraq mailing list. Id.; see also Sullivan, supra
note 54 (explaining that vulnerability mailing lists, such as BugTraq and NTBugTraq, which are used in good faith
to promote security on the Internet are illegal under the Draft Treaty). Both BugTraq and NTBugTraq have well
over 30,000 subscribers. Id.
246. See id. (quoting Granick's comment, "hacking software poses special challenges because most of the
tools have two equal uses").
For example, a popular hacking tool called nMap connects to a remote computer and tells the user if that
computer has any open ports than can be used to establish a connection. Finding such a port is often the
first step in a computer attack, making nMap popular among attackers. But the program is equally
popular with network administrators who want to check their own systems for open ports.
Id.; see also Ted Bridis & Rebecca Buckman, MSNBC, Microsoft's Network is Hacked (Oct. 27, 2000), at
http://www.msnbc.com/news/481927.aspcpl=l (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (illustrating an
additional example of using legal software in an illegal way). On Wednesday, Oct. 25, 2000, Microsoft security
employees discovered a computer break-in. Id. Microsoft believes the hackers stole blueprints to its most valuable
software. Id. Those familiar with the case speculate that the hackers initially gained access to Microsoft's corporate
computers by using hacker software called the QAZ Trojan. Id.
247. See Denning, supra note 213, at 16.
248. Id.; see also Lesley Stones, Forty Nations Unite to Define Cybercrime and Fight Net, Bus. DAY (South
Africa), Nov. 2, 2000, at 20 (reporting that "[mIany service providers believe that such clauses would breach the
confidentiality agreements they sign with their customers").
249. See, e.g., Harrison, supra note 67 (explaining that Senator Fred Thompson, R-Tenn., warned that
Congress should not pass legislation that forces companies to cooperate with investigations).
250. Id.
251. See Ann Harrison, Strategies for Fighting Computer Crime Shared at Security Summit, INFOWORLD
DAILYNEws, May 10, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Library, INFDLY File (noting that Senator Fred Thompson,
R-Tenn, drafted and announced a bill calling for annual reviews of government security practices).
'We don't know yet how to run our own shop,' Thompson acknowledged, adding that companies have
to create their own security defense plans. He said that government could assist by providing grants for
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Civil rights activists share the private sector's concerns regarding the Draft
Treaty 2 and additionally accuse the United States of improperly using its global
influence.Y3 The Global Internet Liberty Campaign (GILC),z 4 a civil rights coalition
of twenty-eight international cyber-rights organizations, opposes the European
Union's Draft Treaty on Cyber-Crime. 5 Specifically, the GILC takes issue with the
involvement of members of the U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of
Investigation in the Treaty's drafting.25 6 "[GILC] members believe that U.S. law
enforcement is attempting to gain international support for modifications to its own
country's laws - support that it has not been able to gain domestically.,,257 The GIILC
fears that, once a significant amount of European countries signed the Treaty and
argue that the United States must "reconcile its laws with - what then will have
become - the international norm," U.S. Treaty supporters could bring the agreement
back to Congress.258 The GILC campaign interprets U.S. tactics as an "endrun"
approach to gain the support overseas for an expansion of authority because it
cannot acquire the support domestically.259
security research, granting tax breaks to companies that develop security tools, enforcing current laws,
and increasing the number of visas for high-tech workers.
Id.
252. See id. (noting that David Banisar, staff counsel for the Electronic Privacy Information Center, in a
protest letter, voiced his prediction that the civil sector would not like the implications of the Draft Treaty either).
"I imagine that the industry guys are not going to be too thrilled either." Id.
253. See infra notes 256-59 and accompanying text.
254. See generally Statement of Principles, Global Internet Liberty Campaign, at http://www.gilc.org/
about/principles.html (visited Nov. 8, 2000) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (explaining the policies
that the GILC advocates). Some of the GILC policies include "insisting that on-line free expression not be restricted
by indirect means such as excessively restrictive governmental or private controls over computer hardware or
software, telecommunications infrastructure, or other essential components," and "allowing on line users to encrypt
their communications and information without restriction." Id.; see also Member Organizations, Global Internet
Liberty Campaign, at http://www.gilc.orglabout/members.html (visited Nov. 8, 2000) (copy on file with The
Transnational Lawyer) (listing the member organizations of the GILC).
255. See Global Internet Liberty Campaign Member Letter on Council of Europe Convention on Cyber-
Crime, GLOBAL INTERNET LIBERY CAMPAIGN, Oct. 18, 2000, at http://www.gil.org/privacy/Coe-letter-1000.html
(copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) [hereinafter GILC Protest Letter] (re-printing the protest letter from
GILC to the Council of Europe Secretary General Walter Schwimmer). The GILC includes groups from the United
States, France, Britain, Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Italy, South Africa, Austria, the Netherlands, and Denmark.
Id.
256. See Lemos, supra note 212 (claiming that the treaty "is little more than a law enforcement wish list").
257. l.
258. Id.
259. See GILC Protest Letter, supra note 255. The GILC protest letter stated that "[p]olice agencies and
powerful private interests acting outside of the democratic means of accountability have sought to use a closed
process to establish rules that will have the effect of binding legislation"); see also Lemos, supra note 212.
'It is in some sense an endrun' said Jim X. Dempsey, senior staff counsel for the Center for Democracy
and Technology, a policy think-tank. 'The concern here is that the U.S. government is going overseas
to promote in whatever international forum it can find, an expansion of authority that is has not been
able to acquire here.'
Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
A successful cyber crime treaty must address three major areas in order to
effectively bring about much needed prosecutions: recognition and enforcement of
criminal judgments issued by a particular country's court, efficient and expedient
cooperation between nations in the retention of evidence and witnesses, and
consistent extradition of criminals. 26° In light of the vast number of computer crimes
occurring today, virus regulation and prosecution comprise the most efficient subject
matter for a treaty because they involve an area of computer crime that all countries
agree must be criminalized.26t
In approaching any long term goal, the drafters of the Treaty must address how
much attention a country is willing to devote to computers and Internet problems "in
a world where 1.2 billion people live on less than $1 a day. 2 62 This issue inevitably
goes hand in hand with the need to measure the depth of the globe's digital divide
and devise strategies for closing high tech gaps in order to ensure that the Internet
is built as an "Internet for all as opposed ... to an Internet for a few.
263
The Council of Europe's Draft Cyber-Crime Treaty provides the best framework
for a successful international solution, a solution with the potential to bring results.
As currently drafted,2 4 the Draft Treaty's biggest potential problem is that the
language may inadvertently result in criminalizing techniques and software
commonly used to aid many computer systems in resisting attack.265 This may result
in a chilling effect on research and the use of many types of security tools.
266
The Draft Treaty is scheduled to be signed into effect in June 2001, but there
still remains a number of interpretation problems within its language. By proceeding
with caution and taking care to address all valid concerns, the Council of Europe can
avoid hasty lawmaking that could do more harm than good. If given the time it
needs to adequately develop, this Draft Treaty has the potential to offer the
international solution necessary to successfully prosecute computer virus authors.
260. See Nicholson, supra note 49, at 254 (listing these necessary elements).
261. See supra note 155 and accompanying text (listing the lengths of sentences for computer crimes in
various nations).
262. See Boyle, supra note 167.
263. Id.
264. See Draft Treaty, supra note 219 (citing to draft number 25 that was declassified by the Council of
Europe on Dec. 22,2000, and is the most current draft of the Treaty as of the date of publication of this Comment).
265. Denning, supra note 213, at 16 (conveying the concern ofPurdue University's Gene Spafford that "some
countries might construe the merepossession of... software [intended for security research] as intent of malicious
activity").
266. Id.
